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Abstract
Model uncertainty has the potential to change importantly how monetary policy is con-
ducted, making it an issue that central banks cannot ignore. Using a standard new
Keynesian business cycle model, this paper analyzes the behavior of a central bank that
conducts policy under discretion while fearing that its model is misspeci￿ed. The main
results are as follows. First, policy performance can be improved if the discretionary
central bank implements a robust policy. This important result is obtained because the
central bank￿ s desire for robustness directs it to assertively stabilize in￿ ation, thereby mit-
igating the stabilization bias associated with discretionary policymaking. Second, the
central bank￿ s fear of model misspeci￿cation leads it to forecast future outcomes under the
belief that in￿ ation (in particular) will be persistent and have large unconditional vari-
ance, raising the probability of extreme outcomes. Private agents, however, anticipating
the policy response, make decisions under the belief that in￿ ation will be more closely
stabilized, that is, more tightly distributed, than under rational expectations. Finally, as
a technical contribution, the paper shows how to solve with robustness an important class
of linear-quadratic decision problems.
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System.1 Introduction
It is the nature of models to simplify reality. Unfortunately, this simpli￿cation goes hand-
in-hand with model misspeci￿cation and model uncertainty; it weakens the foundations sup-
porting model-based policy design and poses important challenges for central banks. To
what extent does achieving robustness to model uncertainty require a sacri￿ce in policy per-
formance? How does model uncertainty shape the beliefs that the central bank and private
agents hold about future economic outcomes? Does a central bank￿ s concern for model mis-
speci￿cation have a material e⁄ect on policy outcomes? These questions have important
implications for monetary policy, and although central banks have always had to grapple with
them, if not always explicitly, there is relatively little consensus about their answers.
This paper investigates these questions in the context of a standard new Keynesian business
cycle model in which households, ￿rms, and a central bank reside. The model is typical of
those used to analyze monetary policy (Clarida, Gal￿, and Gertler, 1999) and is similar in spirit,
if somewhat simpler, than Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters
(2003). To introduce model uncertainty, we follow Hansen and Sargent (2008) and assume
that the central bank is skeptical of its model, fearing that it may be distorted by speci￿cation
errors. Thus, the central bank in this economy designs policy while seeking robustness to
unstructured perturbations about its approximating model. Importantly, in this analysis the
central bank formulates its robust policy while taking into account that the distortions it fears
also a⁄ect how private agents form expectations, similar to Woodford (2010).
An important result that emerges from the analysis is that robustness need not entail a
decline in policy performance. To the contrary, a central bank that implements a robust
policy may actually improve policy performance, and not just in extreme, low-probability
states of nature, but on average. Although this result may seem surprising on the surface,
it has a clear and intuitive explanation. When expectations are rational, time-inconsistency
leads to a welfare-lowering stabilization bias in which in￿ ation is understabilized and output
is overstabilized relative to the commitment policy (Dennis and S￿derstr￿m, 2006). To the
extent that a fear of model uncertainty directs the discretionary central bank to stabilize in￿ a-
tion more tightly, the desire for robustness can mitigate the stabilization bias and potentially
raise welfare. In e⁄ect, the central bank￿ s fear of model uncertainty can act similarly to a
commitment mechanism.
Ordinarily, a mechanism like a concern for reputation (Barro and Gordon, 1983), an opti-
1mal contract (Walsh, 1995), the appointment of an optimally conservative central banker (Ro-
go⁄, 1985), or the strategic delegation of policy objectives by a benevolent authority (Walsh,
2003) is required to improve on discretionary policymaking. But with robustness it is a malev-
olent planner that strategically designs the model (not the policy objectives), and the actions
of the malevolent planner arise endogenously to re￿ ect not the central bank￿ s desire to raise
welfare, but rather its fear of model misspeci￿cation. Because a fear of model misspeci￿cation
can lower the cost of discretion, absent a commitment technology, a country may well bene￿t
from appointing as head of its central bank someone who is suitably pessimistic about the
in￿ ationary consequences of shocks.
When analyzing the central bank￿ s robust policy, we take advantage of results in Hansen,
Sargent, and Tallarini (1999) and Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetova, and Williams (2006)
that relate the multiple models in robust control to the multiple priors in uncertainty aversion
(Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) to reinterpret the solution to the robust control problem. A
connection between robust control and uncertainty aversion arises because the worst-case spec-
i￿cation errors that emerge in the solution to the robust control problem manifest themselves
in the form of worst-case shock processes. These worst-case shock processes can be interpreted
as a set of worst-case beliefs, or a worst-case prior over future states, that is distorted relative
to rational expectations. From the uncertainty aversion perspective, the analysis illustrates
how a central bank￿ s fear of misspeci￿cation can distort importantly￿ and asymmetrically￿ its
beliefs about likely future economic outcomes and the beliefs that private agents hold. Thus,
where the central bank￿ s worst-case beliefs emphasize the possibility that in￿ ation may be
persistent and have a large unconditional variance, anticipating the policy response, private
agents￿beliefs emphasize that in￿ ation will be more closely stabilized, and more tightly dis-
tributed, than under rational expectations. In addition, because the central bank￿ s worst-case
beliefs assign greater probability to the tails of the in￿ ation and consumption distributions
than rational expectations do, and because outcomes in the tails of these distributions come
at a disproportionately high cost, the robust policy responds more forcefully to shocks than
the nonrobust policy and generates greater interest rate volatility as a consequence. For this
reason, the central bank￿ s fear of model misspeci￿cation can have important e⁄ects on policy
outcomes.
Relatively few papers use robust control to analyze optimal monetary policy, and even fewer
focus on discretionary policymaking. Leitemo and S￿derstr￿m (2008) ask whether a greater
desire for robustness makes a discretionary central bank respond more aggressively to shocks
2and argue that the answer depends on the type of shock and the source of misspeci￿cation.
In terms of its methodological contribution, this paper is most closely related to Giordani and
S￿derlind (2004), Dennis (2008), and Hansen and Sargent (2008, chapter 16). In contrast to
Giordani and S￿derlind (2004), who, as part of their analysis, also consider the solution of
linear-quadratic robust control problems when policy is conducted under discretion, we make
use of the fact that all agents necessarily reside within the same model. Thus, when designing
its robust policy, we assume that the policymaker fears that private sector expectations are
distorted by model misspeci￿cation. In contrast to Dennis (2008) and Hansen and Sargent
(2008, chapter 16), this paper analyzes robust time-consistent policies, whereas they analyze
robust commitment policies.
Although robust control provides an organized framework for studying how agents respond
to model uncertainty, a framework that has connections to risk-sensitive preferences (Whittle,
1990), H-in￿nity control (Ba‚ sar and Bernhard, 2008), and uncertainty aversion, it is not
the only framework for analyzing model uncertainty and nor is it the only minmax-based
framework. Other minmax-based approaches, some of which allow for multiple approximating
models, are employed by Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999, 2003), Tetlow and von zur
Muehlin (2001), Onatski and Stock (2002), Giannoni (2002), Levin and Williams (2003),
Onatski and Williams (2003), and Brock, Durlauf, and West (2007).1 A prominent alternative
to robust control is to formulate the decision problem from a Bayesian perspective, as per
Batini, Justiniano, Levine, and Pearlman (2006). The Bayesian approach allows both model
and parameter uncertainty to be analyzed within a uni￿ed decision-theoretic framework, but,
unlike robust control which focuses on worst-case environments, it requires that priors be
supplied and placed over fully articulated parameter and model spaces. Blake and Zampolli
(2006) and Svensson and Williams (2007) approach robust policy design within a Markov-
Jump-Linear-Quadratic framework. Kuester and Wieland (2010) study robust policy design
in a Euro-area model using both Bayesian and minmax methods; they also consider uncertainty
aversion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the new Key-
nesian business cycle model that is used as a laboratory to study the e⁄ects of robustness.
Section 3 formulates the robust Markov-perfect Stackelberg problem and presents its solution.
Section 4 describes the connection between the robust Markov-perfect Stackelberg problem and
uncertainty aversion. Section 5 demonstrates how the central bank￿ s desire for robustness dis-
1Rustem and Howe (2002) analyze a wide-array of minimax-based robust decision environments.
3torts its expectation￿ s operator and thereby in￿ uences monetary policy. Section 6 establishes
the key result that a central bank￿ s desire for robustness can act like a commitment mecha-
nism and lower the cost of discretion. Section 7 analyzes some factors that in￿ uence whether
robustness improves policy performance and demonstrates a connection between the cost of
robustness and the size of the stabilization bias. Section 8 concludes.
2 The model
This section describes the stylized hybrid new Keynesian business cycle model that we use as
a laboratory to study how a central bank￿ s fear of model misspeci￿cation a⁄ects policy. The
model contains equations explaining in￿ ation, ￿t, and consumption, ct, as a function of the
short-term nominal interest rate, it, and two serially correlated shocks, st and dt, and is given
by
￿t = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Et￿t+1 + ￿￿t￿1 + ￿ct + st; (1)
ct = (1 ￿ ￿)Etct+1 + ￿ct￿1 ￿ ￿(it ￿ Et￿t+1) + dt; (2)
st = ￿st￿1 + ￿""t; (3)
dt = ￿dt￿1 + ￿￿￿t: (4)
Equation (1) describes a hybrid new Keynesian Phillips curve in which forward-dynamics






governs the importance of forward-looking expectations in price-setting,
equaling zero under Calvo-pricing (Calvo, 1983), ￿ 2 (0;1) represents the subjective discount
factor, and ￿ 2 (0;1), the coe¢ cient on consumption, is a function of the share of ￿rms that
set their price optimally each period. Equation (2) summarizes consumption behavior in an






regulates the importance of habits while ￿ 2 (0;1), the coe¢ cient on the ex ante
real interest rate, denotes the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. Supply and demand
shocks, st and dt, described by equations (3) and (4), respectively, each follow ￿rst-order





The short-term nominal interest rate, it, serves as the central bank￿ s policy instrument.
The central bank conducts policy with discretion, choosing fikg
1
k=t to minimize its policy











where ￿ 2 [0;1) and ￿ 2 (0;1). Under certain circumstances, equation (5) can be viewed as
a second-order accurate approximation to household welfare (Benigno and Woodford, 2006).
For the purposes of this paper, however, this objective function is taken to be primal.
The monetary policy transmission mechanism largely operates as follows. Because some
prices are rigid, a rise in the nominal interest rate raises the ex ante real interest rate, which
lowers current period demand as households seek to defer consumption. Responding to
lower demand, ￿rms that can change their price moderate their price increase, which damps
in￿ ation. Monetary policy also operates through in￿ ation expectations, with higher interest
rates lowering in￿ ation expectations and, hence, also current in￿ ation.
Although the model is clearly stylized, its usefulness resides in the fact that it is simple
enough to be easily understood, yet rich enough to illustrate the importance robustness plays
in shaping policy and economic outcomes.
3 A discretionary Stackelberg leader￿ s robust decision problem
This section presents a method for solving linear-quadratic decision problems in which a Stack-
elberg leader conducts policy under discretion while seeking robustness to model misspeci￿-
cation. The solution strategy is to cast the robust decision problem in a form that makes it
amenable to the control methods used to solve forward-looking models with rational expec-
tations. The section￿ s main contribution is to show how to solve for a Markov-perfect Nash
equilibrium￿ the approximating equilibrium￿ in which the leader employs a policy designed
strategically to guard against model misspeci￿cation, while the followers, who do not fear
model misspeci￿cation, make decisions and form expectations taking the leader￿ s desire for
robustness into account.
The material presented below is related to Giordani and S￿derlind (2004), who also consider
robust decision problems involving discretionary planners.2 Unlike Giordani and S￿derlind
(2004), here the leader￿ s robust decision problem is formulated on the basis that all expecta-
tions are informed by the misspeci￿ed model.
2Dennis (2008), Hansen and Sargent (2008, chapter 16), and Dennis, Leitemo, and S￿derstr￿m (2009) all
consider robust Stackelberg problems in which the leader can commit, but they do not consider discretion.
53.1 The problem
The economy consists of a Stackelberg leader, such as a central bank, a ￿scal authority, or,
more generally, a government, and one or more followers, such as households, ￿rms, and other
private agents. All agents in the economy are assumed to share an approximating model
that they believe comes closest to describing the economy.3 According to this approximating
model, an n ￿ 1 vector of endogenous variables, zt, consisting of n1 predetermined variables,
xt, and n2 (n2 = n ￿ n1) nonpredetermined variables, yt, evolves over time according to
xt+1 = A11xt + A12yt + B1ut + C1"t+1; (6)
Etyt+1 = A21xt + A22yt + B2ut; (7)
where ut is a p ￿ 1 vector of policy control variables, "t ￿ i:i:d:[0;Ins] is an ns ￿ 1 (ns ￿ n1)
vector of white-noise innovations, and Et is the private sector￿ s mathematical expectations
operator conditional upon period t information. The matrices A11, A12, A21, A22, B1, and
B2 are conformable with xt, yt, and ut, as necessary, and contain the structural parameters
that govern preferences and technology. The matrix C1 is determined to ensure that "t has
the identity matrix as its variance-covariance matrix.
If the approximating model is known to be correctly speci￿ed, then the leader￿ s problem
in period t is to choose its control variables fukg
1























, subject to equations (6) and (7),
Markov-perfection, and a known xt. Among other assumptions, the weighting matrices W







is required to be positive
semi-de￿nite.4
However, although the approximating model describes most accurately the economy￿ s
structure, the leader is skeptical of the model, fearing that it may be misspeci￿ed. To
accommodate its fear, the leader introduces a vector of speci￿cation errors, vt+1, disguised
3This terminology follows Hansen and Sargent (2008). Elsewhere, notably Onatski and Williams (2003),
Giordani and S￿derlind (2004), Dennis, Leitemo, and S￿derstr￿m (2006, 2009) and Tillmann (2009), the term
￿reference model￿is used.
4The (nondistorted) decision problem described above is widely used to analyze discretionary policymaking
by central banks. Following Oudiz and Sachs (1985), Backus and Dri¢ ll (1986), and Currie and Levine (1986),
the problem is solved for a Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium by formulating it recursively and employing
dynamic programming.
6by the shocks that hit the model, and surrounds its approximating model with the class of
distorted models
xt+1 = A11xt + A12yt + B1ut + C1 (vt+1 + "t+1); (9)
Etyt+1 = A21xt + A22yt + B2ut; (10)
where the sequence of speci￿cation errors, fvk+1g
1







k+1vk+1 ￿ ￿; (11)
￿ 2 [0;￿), whose satisfaction de￿nes the sense in which the approximating model, summarized
by equations (6) and (7), is a ￿good￿one. Note that in the special case in which ￿ = 0, the
nondistorted decision problem is restored.
The speci￿cation errors enter the distorted model nonparametrically. However, their
nature and behavior are determined as part of equilibrium and since we seek a Markov-
perfect equilibrium, in equilibrium the speci￿cation errors must follow a Markov process.
Further, the speci￿cation errors enter the distorted model additively and are constrained
by a boundedness condition that is quadratic. These assumptions are not without loss of
generality, but they facilitate solution by ensuring that the robust decision problem remains
linear-quadratic. As will become clear, because the speci￿cation errors enter the distorted
model additively, the approach highlights uncertainty about the shock processes and allows a
connection between robust control and uncertainty aversion. At the same time, with additive
speci￿cation errors, the approach may be less germane if data uncertainty (Orphanides, 2003)
or parameter uncertainty is the primary concern (Onatski and Williams, 2003).
The distorted model, described by equations (9) and (10), constrains the leader￿ s decision
problem. In making its decision, the leader believes that all agents reside within the distorted
model. As a consequence, in this decision problem the leader and the followers are all assumed
to form expectations using the distorted model. Put di⁄erently, as part of its robust decision,
the leader fears that private agents use the distorted model to form expectations.
To guard against the speci￿cation errors that it fears, the leader formulates policy subject
to the distorted model with the mind-set that the speci￿cation errors will be as damaging
as possible, a position operationalized through the metaphor that fvk+1g
1
k=t is chosen by a
￿ctitious evil agent whose objectives are diametrically opposed to those of the leader. Ac-
cordingly, the leader￿ s robust problem is to choose fukg
1
k=t to minimize equation (8) and for
7the evil agent to choose fvk+1g
1
k=t to maximize equation (8), subject to equations (9), (10),
and (11). The evil agent￿ s role in this problem is simply to help the leader devise a robust
policy. Following Hansen and Sargent (2008, chapter 2), the way forward is to apply the
Luenberger (1969) Lagrange multiplier theorem to replace this constraint problem, involving

















￿ 2 [￿;1), is minimized with respect to fukg1
k=t and maximized with respect to fvk+1g1
k=t,
subject to equations (9) and (10). The multiplier, or robustness parameter, ￿, represents the
shadow price of a marginal relaxation of the boundedness condition, equation (11). Larger
values for ￿, which correspond to smaller values of ￿, signify greater con￿dence in the adequacy
of the approximating model. Of course, in the limit as ￿ " 1, the nondistorted decision
problem is again restored.
The di¢ culty with the robust decision problem as it currently stands is that nonprede-
termined variables, yt, enter the constraints. However, this di¢ culty can be overcome by
exploiting the Stackelberg relationship between the leader and the followers to obtain an ex-
pression linking the nonpredetermined variables to the state variables and the leader￿ s decision
variables. Because the state vector is given by xt and the decision problem is linear-quadratic,
in any Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium the nonpredetermined variables, yt, must be a linear
function of the state vector, xt. As a consequence, expectations of future nonpredetermined
variables must satisfy
Etyt+1 = HEtxt+1; (13)
where H has yet to be determined. Combining equations (13), (10), and (9), and exploiting
the fact that the speci￿cation errors are measurable with respect to period t information,
implying Etvt+1 = vt+1, leads to the expressions
xt+1 = Axt + But + Cvt+1 + C1"t+1; (14)
yt = Jxt + Kut + Lvt+1; (15)
where A, B, C, J, K, and L depend on H. Equation (14) describes the law of motion for
the state variables while equation (15) is generally interpreted as the reaction function for
the aggregate private sector. Notice that this reaction function depends on vt+1 as well as
ut, re￿ ecting the fact that in the leader￿ s decision problem the ￿ctitious evil agent is also a
8Stackelberg leader with respect to private agents. This reaction function can be substituted
into equation (12), thereby eliminating the nonpredetermined variables from the problem.
Following these substitutions, recognizing that the value function must take the form
V (xt) = x
0
tVxt + d, the robust multiplier problem can be written recursively as
x
0







tWxt + 2e u
0
tUxt + e u
0













, subject to equation (14). Because the objectives of the leader and the ￿ctitious
evil agent are perfectly misaligned (they play a zero-sum game), the solution to this minmax
problem can be obtained by solving the simultaneous choice problem (Hansen and Sargent,
2008, chapter 7), which, for a given H, is equivalent to the standard discounted stochastic
optimal linear regulator problem, whose solution is known to have the form (Anderson, Hansen,
McGrattan, and Sargent, 1996)
xt+1 = Mxt + C1"t+1 (17)






conformable with ut and vt+1, an update of H is available from the
follower￿ s reaction function, which implies
H = J ￿ KFu ￿ LFv: (19)
Thus, given a conjecture of H, the equations above provide an iterative method for cal-
culating numerically the worst-case equilibrium, which is the equilibrium that governs the
economy￿ s behavior according to the leader￿ s worst-case fears. The worst-case equilibrium
is of interest in its own right, but, more importantly, it is the vehicle through which the
approximating equilibrium is obtained.
3.2 Approximating equilibrium
In the approximating equilibrium, although the leader employs its robust decision rule, the
approximating model is not actually misspeci￿ed and the followers, who are not robust de-
cisionmakers, naturally form their expectations using the approximating model. Given the
leader￿ s robust decision rule, it is straight-forward to recover the (Markov) relationship linking
the nonpredetermined variables to the state variables in the approximating equilibrium by
9solving for the ￿xed point of
b J =
h
A22 ￿ b HA12
i￿1 h





A22 ￿ b HA12
i￿1 h
b HB1 ￿ B2
i
; (21)
b H = b J ￿ b KFu: (22)
Therefore, in the approximating equilibrium, the state variables, the nonpredetermined vari-
ables, and the leader￿ s decision variables are given by
xt+1 =
￿
A11 + A12 b H ￿ B1Fu
￿
xt + C1"t+1; (23)
yt = b Hxt; (24)
ut = ￿Fuxt; (25)
respectively.
4 Robustness and uncertainty aversion
Using a big ￿X￿little ￿x￿notation, the equilibrium law of motion for the state variables in
the worst-case equilibrium can be written as as
xt+1 = (A11 + A12H ￿ B1Fu)xt + C1 (FvXt + "t+1); (26)
Xt+1 = MXt + C1"t+1;
where M ￿ A11 + A12H ￿ B1Fu ￿ C1Fv and xt = Xt in equilibrium. Thus, the worst-case
law of motion for the state variables is one in which the shock processes appear distorted, with
their conditional mean twisted, or slanted, relative to the approximating model.
Equation (26) suggests a connection between robust control and the maxmin expected
utility framework developed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) to describe behavior they refer
to as uncertainty aversion.5 Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) assume that beliefs about the
likelihood of future states are so vague that they are represented by a set of prior densities
rather than by a single prior density. The relationship between uncertainty aversion and
robust control is considered in Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetova, and Williams (2006), who
document conditions under which the multiple models in the robust control framework is
5See also Epstein and Wang (1994), who extend the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) analysis to intertemporal
models.
10behaviorally equivalent in the equilibrium to the multiple priors in the Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) framework.
The arguments in Hansen, Sargent, Turmuhambetova, and Williams (2006) suggest that
the solution to the robust control problem described in the previous section can be obtained
equivalently by solving the problem in which the Stackelberg leader chooses fukg
1
k=t to mini-
mize, and an evil agent chooses point-wise the probabilities in the probability density function,


















xt+1 = A11xt + A12yt + B1ut + C1"t+1; (28)
E￿
tyt+1 = A21xt + A22yt + B2ut; (29)
Markov-perfection, and a known xt. In addition, the di⁄erence between the distorted con-
ditional probability density function, p￿ (xk+1jxt), and the rational expectations conditional
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p￿ (xk+1jxt)dxk+1 = 1;8 xt 2 <n1. Equation (30) is a (discounted) relative
entropy condition (Kullback and Leibler, 1951), in which the expectation of a (log-) likelihood
ratio is taken with respect to a distorted probability density.
The connection between robust control and uncertainty aversion suggests an alternative
interpretation of the worst-case equilibrium. In an important sense, the worst-case equilibrium
can be viewed as a tool, or as a vehicle, for generating the worst-case prior density, with
decisions then made in view of this worst-case prior density. More generally, the connection
between robust control and uncertainty aversion facilitates analyzing robust control problems
in terms of the e⁄ect a fear of model uncertainty has on the beliefs held by the various
6In the approximating model, and hence in the worst-case equilibrium, the number of innovations, ns, will
generally be less than n1. With the state vector, xt, consisting of shocks, st, and predetermined variables, pt,
p(xt+1jxt) is given by p(xt+1jxt) = jDjp(st+1jxt), where D is a Jacobian of transformation. The solution to
the robust control problem provides the Jacobians relevant for the worst-case equilibrium and the approximating
equilibrium.
11agents residing in the model. For this reason, it is the properties of the probability density
functions that underlie the rational expectations equilibrium, the worst-case equilibrium, and
the approximating equilibrium that we characterize and discuss when we analyze the new
Keynesian business cycle model.
5 Robust monetary policy
In this section, we explore the e⁄ect a central bank￿ s desire for robustness can have on ex-
pectations, monetary policy, and the broader economy by applying the tools developed above
to the hybrid new Keynesian model presented in Section 2. Exploiting the connection be-
tween robust control and uncertainty aversion, the analysis focuses on the probability density
functions that underlie beliefs and expectation formation. The model is parameterized on
the basis that the data are observed quarterly. Drawing on an array of studies, but on work
by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003), in particular,
in the equations for in￿ ation and the consumption gap, we set ￿ = 0:99, ￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 0:12,
￿ = 0:4, and ￿ = 0:05; in the shock processes, we set ￿ = ￿ = 0:5, and ￿" = ￿￿ = 1:0; and in
the policy objective function, we set ￿ = 0:5 and ￿ = 0:1. With this parameterization, we
solve the central bank￿ s robust decision problem, examine the nature of the speci￿cation errors
that it fears, document how these speci￿cation errors distort the expectation operator that
the central bank uses to form expectations, and analyze the relationship between robustness
and policy performance.
Before introducing robustness, it is useful to construct a benchmark by solving the nondis-
torted problem in which all expectations are formed rationally. For the parameterization
above, the central bank￿ s optimal discretionary policy can be described by the state-contingent
decision rule7
it = 5:180st + 6:133dt + 0:937￿t￿1 + 0:800ct￿1: (31)
The optimal discretionary policy is to raise the nominal interest rate in response to adverse
supply shocks and stimulatory demand shocks, thereby mitigating their contemporaneous im-
pact on in￿ ation and consumption, and to tighten policy in response to (past) higher in￿ ation
and consumption, thereby returning the economy to steady state more quickly. A notable
feature of equation (31) is that its feedback coe¢ cients are large, revealing aggressive policy
7It is worth noting that all of the policy rules reported in this paper are implementable. In other words, if the
central bank were to implement policy according to F
u and private agents were allowed to reform expectations,
then in the unique stable rational expectations equilibrium, private-agent decision rules are governed by b H.
12responses even under rational expectations.8
5.1 Robustness
To introduce robustness a value for ￿ must be provided. Within the robust decision problem,
￿ represents the shadow price of a marginal relaxation of the constraint on the sequence of
speci￿cation errors, equation (11). Intuitively, ￿large￿values of ￿ indicate that the central
bank is con￿dent that the approximating model is ￿close￿to the data-generating process and
therefore that the speci￿cation errors should be ￿small.￿ In this application, we follow standard
practice and choose ￿ in order to generate a particular detection-error probability, here 0:1.9
A detection-error probability is the probability that an econometrician observing equilibrium
outcomes would make an incorrect inference about whether the approximating equilibrium or
the worst-case equilibrium generated the data. The intuitive connection between ￿ and the
probability of making a detection error is that when ￿ is small, greater di⁄erences between the
distorted model and the reference model (more severe misspeci￿cations) can arise, which are
more easily detected.
Applying the solution method developed above, the worst-case shock processes are
st+1 = 0:545st + 0:038dt + 0:007￿t￿1 + 0:004ct￿1 + "t+1; (32)
dt+1 = 0:041st + 0:544dt + 0:007￿t￿1 + 0:005ct￿1 + ￿t+1: (33)
These worst-case shock processes convey information about the location and behavior of
speci￿cation errors that the central bank should be concerned about. Speci￿cally, the central
bank is concerned that the demand and supply shocks may exhibit greater serial correlation
than the approximating model asserts, that the demand and supply shocks might be correlated,
and that the Phillips curve and the consumption Euler equation may omit terms involving lags
of consumption and in￿ ation. At the same time, these worst-case shock processes re￿ ect how
the central bank￿ s expectation operator is twisted, or slanted, by its fear of misspeci￿cation.10
8These feedback coe¢ cients, particularly those on the shocks, depend importantly on the interest rate
stabilization parameter, ￿, and would be smaller were ￿ larger.
9A technical appendix that accompanies this paper describes in detail the interpretation and calculation
of detection-error probabilities. Alternative descriptions can be found in Hansen, Sargent, and Wang (2002),
Giordani and S￿derlind (2004), Hansen and Sargent (2008, chapter 9), Dennis (2008), Dennis, Leitemo, and
S￿derstr￿m (2006, 2009), and Cateau (2006).
10Values of ￿ that deliver detection-error probabilities below the 0:1 value used here serve to raise the coe¢ -
cients on all of the state variables in the worst case shock processes.
13Figure 1: Distorted and nondistorted unconditional probability densities
Panels A through E display the unconditional probability density functions for
the supply shock, the demand shock, in￿ ation, consumption, and the nominal in-
terest rate, respectively, according to the rational expectations equilibrium, the
worst case equilibrium, and the approximating equilibrium. The worst case equi-
librium densities characterize the pessimistic central banker￿ s expectations. The
approximating equilibrium densities characterize the private sector￿ s expectations.
The rational expectations equilibrium densities characterize the expectations of all
agents when all agents believe the approximating model to be correctly speci￿ed.
Figure 1 displays the unconditional distributions of the supply shock, the demand shock,
in￿ ation, consumption, and the interest rate in the rational expectations equilibrium, the
14worst-case equilibrium, and the approximating equilibrium, under the illustrative assumption
that the innovations, "t and ￿t, are joint n:i:i:d:[0;I] distributed. The probability density
functions associated with the worst-case equilibrium characterize how the central bank forms
expectations and how it fears that private agents will also form their expectations. By
comparison, the probability density functions associated with the approximating equilibrium
characterize how households and ￿rms actually form expectations, which, due to the in￿ uence
of the central bank￿ s robust policy, di⁄er from the rational expectations associated with the
nonrobust decision problem. Note that the probability density functions that the central
bank employs do not coincide with the economy￿ s data generating process, re￿ ecting the
central bank￿ s enduring pessimism about its model.
Relative to rational expectations, the worst-case supply shock (panel A) and demand shock
(panel B) each have greater unconditional variance. Although these distortions to the supply
and demand shocks appear small, they have important e⁄ects on the worst-case distributions
of in￿ ation (panel C), consumption (panel D), and the interest rate (panel E). Speci￿cally,
the central bank￿ s fear of misspeci￿cation causes it to assign greater probability to in￿ ation
and consumption outcomes that would seem extreme under rational expectations. Similarly,
with the central bank￿ s robust policy represented by the state-contingent rule
it = 6:939st + 7:814dt + 1:208￿t￿1 + 0:967ct￿1; (34)
the interest rate￿ s worst-case distribution also exhibits a much greater unconditional variance
than the rational expectations distribution (panel E). Essentially, in terms of its unconditional
expectations operator, the central bank obtains robustness by overweighting the probability
it attaches to extreme in￿ ation (in particular) and consumption outcomes, and this leads
to an interest rate distribution that also assigns greater probability to extreme interest rate
outcomes.
The central bank￿ s desire to guard against extreme outcomes has important implications
for the approximating equilibrium. By designing policy to guard against extreme in￿ ation out-
comes, the robust policy has a strong damping e⁄ect on the distribution of in￿ ation (especially)
and consumption in the approximating equilibrium. As shown in panel C, in the approximat-
ing equilibrium, in￿ ation is distributed much more tightly about its unconditional mean than
when expectations are rational, illustrating how the central bank￿ s fear of misspeci￿cation
leads it to ￿overstabilize￿in￿ ation. Similarly, the robust central bank also ￿overstabilizes￿
consumption (panel D), but at the cost of greater interest rate volatility (panel E).
15Although the unconditional probability densities displayed in Figure 1 reveal the relation-
ship between the central bank￿ s pessimism and the probability it assigns to extreme outcomes,
because they are unconditional they do not reveal how model uncertainty twists, or slants,
the central bank￿ s conditional expectations operator. To this end, with the initial state, xt,
illustratively given by st = dt = ct￿1 = ￿t￿1 = 1, Figure 2 presents the marginal probability
density functions associated with one-quarter-ahead forecasts.
Figure 2: Distorted and nondistorted one-quarter-ahead forecast densities
Panels A through E display the one-quarter-ahead probability density functions
for the supply shock, the demand shock, in￿ ation, consumption, and the nominal
interest rate, respectively, according to the rational expectations equilibrium, the
worst case equilibrium, and the approximating equilibrium, conditional on the
16initial state: st = dt = ￿t￿1 = ct￿1 = 1. The worst case equilibrium densities
characterize the pessimistic central banker￿ s expectations. The approximating
equilibrium densities characterize the private sector￿ s expectations. The rational
expectations equilibrium densities characterize the expectations of all agents when
all agents believe the approximating model to be correctly speci￿ed.
Figure 2 focuses on one-quarter-ahead forecast densities because the recursive nature of the
robust optimization problem implies that it is these densities that are critical for the central
bank￿ s robust decision problem. Complementing Figure 1, panels A and B in Figure 2 show
that, although the worst-case probability densities for the supply and the demand shocks are
shifted to the right of those associated with the approximating equilibrium (which, of course,
coincide with rational expectations), the distortions are reasonably modest. At the same
time, these apparently small distortions to the shock distributions have a large impact on the
one-quarter-ahead forecast densities for in￿ ation (panel C), consumption (panel D) and the
interest rate (panel E). Revealing a more subtle story than Figure 1, Figure 2 shows that the
worst-case density for in￿ ation is slanted to the right, with the central bank fearing higher
in￿ ation outcomes, and that the worst-case density for consumption is slanted to the left,
with the central bank fearing lower consumption outcomes. Although it may seem more intu-
itive for the central bank to fear higher consumption outcomes, which would be in￿ ationary,
the probability densities are not unconstrained. Through the structure of the approximat-
ing model, because the central bank pessimistically expects higher in￿ ation outcomes, it also
expects higher interest rate outcomes, which leads it to expect lower consumption outcomes.
Notice, however, that, unlike for consumption and the interest rate, where the distorted proba-
bility density function for future in￿ ation is right-slanted, its counterpart in the approximating
equilibrium is left-slanted.
6 Detectability and the cost of robustness
In the absence of misspeci￿cation, the optimal commitment policy is (weakly) superior to all
other policies, including robust policies. It follows immediately that a desire for robustness
cannot improve policy loss when the central bank can commit. However, when policy is con-
ducted with discretion, stabilization bias provides an avenue through which robust policies can
potentially improve upon nonrobust policies. To investigate the relationship between robust-
ness and policy performance, this section examines the cost of robustness and its relationship
17to the robustness parameter and the probability of making a detection error.
One simple measure of the cost of robustness is










ap denotes policy loss in the approximating equilibrium and Ld
re denotes policy loss
in the rational expectations equilibrium. According to this measure, positive values for C
indicate that policy performance in the approximating equilibrium is inferior to what would
be achieved in the rational expectations equilibrium.11
Figure 3 traces out the relationship between the robustness parameter and the probability
of making a detection error (panel A), between the robustness parameter and the cost of
robustness (panel B), and between the robustness parameter and the level of policy loss (panel
C). Panel A reveals that the probability of making a detection error is monotonically increasing
in the robustness parameter. Underlying this result is the fact that, as ￿ increases, greater
weight is placed on the approximating model as being correct, the worst-case distortions are
more tightly constrained, and the robust policy converges to the rational expectations policy.
As a consequence, in the limit as ￿ " 1, data generated from the approximating equilibrium
look increasingly like those generated from the worst case equilibrium and the probability of
making a detection error converges to 0:5 (Hansen and Sargent, 2008, chapter 9). Panel B
depicts the relationship between the robustness parameter and the cost of robustness. What
panel B reveals is that an increase in the central bank￿ s desire for robustness (smaller values
for ￿) actually cause the cost of robustness to decline, not rise. In e⁄ect, even if speci￿cation
errors are absent, the central bank is better o⁄ using the robust policy than the rational
expectations policy. Although this result may seem surprising at ￿rst, its genesis lies in the fact
that monetary policy is conducted with discretion rather than with commitment.12 Because
private agents are forward-looking, the time-consistent policy with rational expectations is not
optimal￿ it does not coincide with the optimal commitment policy￿ and other policies exist
whose performance more closely approaches that of the optimal commitment policy. Related
to panel B, panel C shows that the di⁄erence in policy performance between the robust and
nonrobust policies can be large in an absolute sense.
11A technical appendix that accompanies this paper describes how the policy loss function is evaluated.
12Dennis and Ravenna (2008) obtain a related result from a model in which a central bank conducts policy
while learning. The connection between the two results is that in each case policy is conducted with discretion
and the central bank is only boundedly rational.
18Figure 3: Detectability and the cost of robustness
For the hybrid new Keynesian model, the panels in Figure 3 display the relation-
ship between the robustness parameter and the probability of making a detection
error (panel A), the relationship between the robustness parameter and the cost of
robustness (panel B), and the relationship between the robustness parameter and
policy loss in the rational expectations and approximating equilibria (panel C).
As Dennis and S￿derstr￿m (2006) document, in rational expectations models discretionary
policies overstabilize consumption and understabilize in￿ ation, relative to commitment poli-
cies, giving rise to a stabilization bias. This bias can be unwound by stabilizing in￿ ation more
aggressively and stabilizing consumption less aggressively, however the absence of a commit-
ment mechanism makes this infeasible when expectations are rational. But model uncertainty
imparts a deviation from rational expectations, which causes the central bank to implement
a policy that counteracts the likelihood of extreme in￿ ation outcomes, partly mitigating the
19size of the stabilization bias. At the same time, as Figure 1 showed, the robust policy also
stabilizes consumption more aggressively, and, as a consequence, whether robustness raises or
lowers policy loss relative to the time-consistent rational expectations policy is likely to be
parameter and model dependent, an issue to which we now turn.
7 Factors that in￿ uence the cost of robustness
The previous section found that the cost of robustness was negative. This implies, of course,
that the discretionary central bank￿ s desire for robustness actually improves policy perfor-
mance. This section focuses on the factors that in￿ uence the cost of robustness and that
determine whether it is positive or negative. We show that the cost of robustness is not
always negative, but that it is negative for a wide range of parameter values, and that the cost
of robustness is related to the size of the discretionary stabilization bias. Speci￿cally, the cost
of robustness tends to be more negative when the discretionary stabilization bias is large.
We begin by examining a special case of the model in which the central bank￿ s desire for
robustness is detrimental to policy performance. Let ￿ = 0, so that the central bank assigns
no weight to interest rate stabilization, ￿ = 0, so that there is no in￿ ation indexation in the
Phillips curve, and ￿ = 0, so that the supply shock is not longer serially correlated. With
this parameterization the discretionary central bank optimally o⁄sets demand shocks, which
makes the policymaker immune to misspeci￿cation of the consumption Euler equation. The













￿t = ￿Et￿t+1 + ￿ct + st: (37)
After introducing a desire for robustness, and parameterizing the model according to ￿ =
0:99, ￿ = 0:05, ￿ = 0:08, and ￿" = 1:0 (Woodford, 2010), Figure 4 displays the relationship
between the robustness parameter, ￿, and the probability of making a detection error (panel
A), between the robustness parameter and the cost of robustness (panel B), and between the
robustness parameter and policy performance (panel C).
20Figure 4: Detectability and the cost of robustness (Woodford model)
For the Woodford (2010) model, the panels in Figure 4 display the relationship
between the robustness parameter and the probability of making a detection er-
ror (panel A), the relationship between the robustness parameter and the cost of
robustness (panel B), and the relationship between the robustness parameter and
policy loss in the rational expectations and approximating equilibria (panel C).
Although the increase is small, no larger than 0:25 of a percentage point for the values of
￿ considered, Figure 4, panel B, shows that for this parameterization of the model the central
bank￿ s desire for robustness raises policy loss, if only modestly (panel C), establishing that
robustness does not improve policy loss for all parameterizations of the hybrid new Keynesian
model. This robust decision problem is closely related to one considered by Woodford (2010),
who employed this parameterization and also found that the discretionary central bank￿ s desire
for robustness led to a deteriation in policy performance.
21Returning to the hybrid new Keynesian model analyzed in sections 5 and 6, we now
consider independent variation in ￿, ￿, ￿, and ￿, again holding the detection-error probability
constant at 0:2513, by varying (separately) ￿ between 0:00 and 0:95, ￿ between 0:00 and 0:95,
￿ between 0:00 and 0:50, and ￿ between 0:30 and 0:50, keeping the parameters that are not
being changed at the values reported in section 5. The results of this exercise are displayed
in Figure 5 alongside a measure of the discretionary stabilization bias, which is constructed
according to










re denotes policy loss under commitment and Ld
re denotes policy loss under discretion,
both in the absence of robustness. Aside from special cases in which there is no time-
consistency problem, this measure of the stabilization bias, which measures as a percent the
decline in loss that would be associated with the central bank being able to commit, is unam-
biguously negative. Because the policy loss associated with the optimal commitment policy
with rational expectations cannot be surpassed, equation (38) provides a lower bound for the
cost of robustness measure.
13To prevent the detection-error probability from changing as the model parameters are changed, ￿ is recal-
ibrated for each parameterization. Note, however, that changes in ￿, while important for magnitudes, do not
in￿ uence whether the cost of robustness is positive or negative. The detection-error probability was set to 0:25
to ensure that results could be obtained for all parameterizations of the model.
22Figure 5: Stabilization bias and the cost of robustness (hybrid NK model)
For the hybrid new Keynesian model, panels A through D in Figure 5 display
how the cost of robustness measure, C, and the stabilization bias measure, S, vary
with changes in ￿, ￿, ￿, and ￿, respectively.
There are three important results to take away from Figure 5. First, the cost of robustness
is negative for almost all parameter combinations considered. Only in Panel A, for very
large values of ￿, is the cost of robustness positive. Second, the cost of robustness and the
stabilization bias are strongly correlated, particularly with respect to variation in ￿ and ￿.
Speci￿cally, smaller values for the stabilization bias are associated with smaller values for the
cost of robustness. Third, although the cost of robustness is generally negative, it generally
falls well shy of the stabilization bias, which is to say that although robustness can lower policy
loss it is certainly not a complete substitute for a commitment mechanism.
23The results in Figure 5 suggest strongly that persistence in in￿ ation, particularly per-
sistence introduced through the cost-push shock, is closely associated with the ￿nding that
robustness can improve policy loss. Figure 5 also reveals that in￿ ation persistence is a key
factor governing the magnitude of the discretionary stabilization bias, consistent with Dennis
and S￿derstr￿m (2006). Importantly, the result that the cost of robustness is negative holds
for a wide range of parameter values in this model, suggesting that it may hold more generally
among new Keynesian models, particularly those for which expectations are an important
policy channel and the discretionary stabilization bias is large.
8 Conclusion
This paper developed a method for solving robust Markov-perfect Stackelberg problems. This
solution method was applied to a stylized hybrid new Keynesian business cycle model to
examine the e⁄ect a concern for model misspeci￿cation can have on the behavior and policy
decisions of a central bank that conducts policy with discretion. Although robust control
methods are used to generate the relevant equilibria, a connection between robust control and
uncertainty aversion was exploited to focus the analysis on the properties of the probability
densities that households, ￿rms, and the central bank use to form expectations.
The analysis revealed that a concern for model uncertainty causes the central bank to
make decisions on the basis of a distorted conditional expectations operator that emphasizes
the possibility that in￿ ation (in particular) and consumption may be more persistent than
their approximating model acknowledges. Because the central bank fears that shocks to in-
￿ ation and consumption will persist, it implements a policy that tends to stabilize in￿ ation
and consumption more tightly than the rational expectations policy. Through their e⁄ect on
in￿ ation, robust policies can improve on nonrobust policies and lower policy loss. This result
arises because the central bank￿ s concern for robustness moves it to stabilize in￿ ation more
tightly than would be credible were expectations rational, and this greater in￿ ation stabiliza-
tion partly o⁄sets the higher variance of in￿ ation associated with the discretionary stabilization
bias. As a consequence, in this hybrid new Keynesian model and with discretionary policy-
making, some degree of robustness to model uncertainty can be attained without sacri￿cing
policy performance. Although the result that robustness can improve policy performance in
the absence of a commitment mechanism is parameter dependent, it holds for a wide range
of parameter values in the hybrid new Keynesian model. In fact, the connection between
the cost of robustness and the magnitude of the discretionary stabilization bias suggests that
24robustness is more likely to improve policy performance in models and for parameterizations
where the time inconsistency problem is important and the stabilization bias is large.
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